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A principal role for Indigenous peoples in nature conservation in the IACtHR Garífuna of Cayos Cochinos judgment

1 hour ago
10 min read


Ms Maja Dehamers

Maja is an FWO-funded doctoral researcher at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of Ghent University. Her research focuses on the in situ visits of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in which the Court sends a delegation of judges and other court personnel to visit the site of the facts of a case to gather additional evidence. The focus is on indigenous cases in Honduras and Argentina.

She studied Law in Ghent and completed her Master's in 2024. Passionate about human rights, she also studied Spanish and took courses on Latin American history. 



Introduction


Sometimes human rights cases are just like reality TV. As in, sometimes reality TV leads to human rights violations. In September 2025, members of the Indigenous Garífuna community disrupted the filming of the first episode of the Spanish survival series Supervivientes in Honduras. 


Tourism authorities describe Cayos Cochinos as paradise, ignoring Indigenous struggles. Source: https://www.lexusauto.es/estilolexus/lifestyle/cayos-cochinos-paraiso-para-visitar-en-un-dia
Tourism authorities describe Cayos Cochinos as paradise, ignoring Indigenous struggles. Source: https://www.lexusauto.es/estilolexus/lifestyle/cayos-cochinos-paraiso-para-visitar-en-un-dia

Their peaceful protest denounced the restricted access to their ancestral lands that was put in place when the series was filmed. Cayos Cochinos, a picturesque archipelago near the North coast of Honduras, is a protected nature area. Access to certain parts is restricted by the government, even to the Indigenous Garífuna, who are not even allowed to fish nearby. Organising a survival reality show in these areas, with jumps out of helicopters and obstacle courses built in the water, however, was deemed perfectly fine.


Two months after the Garífuna protest, and more than 22 years after the petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Garífuna community’s claims were addressed in the Comunidad Garífuna de Cayos Cochinos y sus miembros v. Honduras judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or Court).

Protesting members of OFRANEH, the Garífuna organization litigating the Cayos Cochinos case. Source: https://contracorriente.red/2025/05/22/estado-hondureno-acusado-de-violar-derechos-territoriales-de-la-comunidad-garifuna-en-cayos-cochinos/
Protesting members of OFRANEH, the Garífuna organization litigating the Cayos Cochinos case. Source: https://contracorriente.red/2025/05/22/estado-hondureno-acusado-de-violar-derechos-territoriales-de-la-comunidad-garifuna-en-cayos-cochinos/

It marks the fourth time the Court condemns Honduras for violations regarding the Indigenous Garífuna community. More than ten years after the first two Garífuna cases, this judgment emphasised the newer developments in the Court’s case law. It also marked the first time the Court ruled on a maritime-based Indigenous territory. More importantly for this blog post, the Court’s wording on the relationship between Indigenous communities and nature conservation should be highlighted, as it could become a useful legal contribution to the debate.



Abandoned at high sea


While the reality TV aspect of the case drew some media attention, the central issue the Court ruled on is the management plan of the Monumento Natural Marino Archipiélago de Cayos Cochinos. Although the local Garífuna communities obtained legal titles to the archipelago decades ago, the management of the protected natural area is organised by the Fundación Cayos Cochinos, while the rules are enforced by the government. This foundation not only allowed the reality series to be filmed in the area but also imposed severe restrictions on the communities’ access to their lands, including bans on fishing and certain fishing techniques. Limited tourism, however, was allowed, even though it was said to generate conflicts.


None of these decisions was made with the free, prior and informed consultation (FPIC) of the Garífuna. Throughout the years, enforcement of these restrictions was accompanied by a climate of threats and violence. One account even recalls the coast guard confiscating fishing boats at high sea and then leaving the two Garífuna owners in the water in the middle of the ocean.


In the judgment, the Court found a violation of the right to FPIC because the protected area was established without input from the community. The adoption of management plans for the area without proper consultation and the production of reality shows violated the right to political participation, the right of access to information, and the right to cultural identity in relation to the right to collective property. A violation of the right to personal integrity was found because of the violence suffered by the community, aggravated by the State’s inaction in investigating these incidents, which also constituted a violation of the right to a fair trial. The restrictions on fishing and the lacklustre management of the protected area – to the detriment of biodiversity – also led to a violation of their right to culturally adequate food.


In sum, the Garífuna communities of Cayos Cochinos finally got recognition for the human rights violations they have suffered. Unfortunately, given Honduras’s poor track record of complying with the Court’s judgements, their struggle probably will not end here. As for the reality show, while some news sources reported Supervivientes may move to Ecuador, official communications from the producers indicated the show will continue in Honduras.



Debated developments


The Court’s judgement featured many of the – some more than others – recent developments in its jurisprudence, such as finding a violation of Article 26 (progressive development) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) or applying the precautionary principle. As usual, several judges opted to write separate opinions to defend or disavow these lines of jurisprudence. While not the focus of this blog post, they are worth highlighting to stay up to date with the Court’s jurisprudence.



Article 26 and ratio temporis applicability


First, the Court found violations of Article 26 ACHR on several points. This provision on the progressive realisation of social, economic and cultural rights has been the subject of debate for some time. A majority of the Court considers it justiciable, meaning violations can be found, while a minority continues to resist its expanding application. In previous jurisprudence, based on this provision, the Court has found violations of the right to water, a healthy environment, adequate food, cultural identity, and social security. In Cayos Cochinos, Article 26 formed the basis for violations of the right to cultural integrity and culturally adequate food. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Alberto Borea Odría expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's identification of several independent rights under the umbrella of Article 26 ACHR as if they existed within the ACHR. Judge Rodrigo Mudrovitsch countered this in his concurring opinion, stating that this is a densification, not a departure from previous jurisprudence. In his view, the Court gave a deeper, thorough understanding of social, economic and cultural rights and therefore did not invent new rights.


Secondly, Article 26 also formed part of the legal basis for the violations related to the lack of FPIC, which affected the Court's reasoning on when the right to FPIC became a state obligation. This mattered in the case, as some violations would not have been able to be discussed if the Court’s competence ratione temporis started later. As described by Daniel Cerqueira, the IACtHR has oscillated between two positions on when a state’s obligations regarding FPIC start: either from the date of the ratification of the International Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) or from the date of ratification of the ACHR, which is often earlier than the ILO 169 ratification.


This ILO Convention 169 is considered one of the most important instruments on Indigenous rights and, among other things, explicitly introduces the obligation of FPIC. It has been signed by most Latin American countries. In developing its first jurisprudence on Indigenous rights, the IACtHR used ILO 169 as a guiding instrument to interpret the ACHR and to find violations of the right to FPIC. This has led to debates about the legal basis for this right (and its temporal implications), resulting in judgments with different stances on the matter (see Image 3).


Image 3: Created by the author, partly based on analysis of Daniel Cerqueira
Image 3: Created by the author, partly based on analysis of Daniel Cerqueira

In the Court’s previous 2023 judgment on Garífuna rights in Honduras, Garifuna Community of San Juan v. Honduras, the Court opted not to analyse anything prior to the ILO 169 ratification. In that case, the argumentation of the State (p. 13) proposed a position that would introduce an even later start date for obligation. It argued that states were only made aware of their obligations regarding Indigenous peoples after the Court started applying and interpreting the convention in favour of Indigenous peoples’ territorial rights, in the 2001 case Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community.


In Cayos Cochinos, however, the Court explicitly rejected this last line of argumentation, as it had done in the 2024 case Pueblo Indígena U’Wa v. Colombia. Furthermore, in departure from the other Honduran cases, the Cayos Cochinos judgment pinned the starting date of obligations to the ratification of the ACHR. Multiple judges had a dissenting opinion on this decision that, in their eyes, could be seen as a retroactive approach. Judge Nancy Hernandez López disagreed with an autonomous right to FPIC before the ratification of ILO 169. Judge Patricia Perez Goldberg shared a similar point of view and also pointed out the inconsistency the Honduran state faced with these different decisions. Both she and Judge Alberto Borea Odría pointed out that the first formulation of a solely ACHR-based right to FPIC occurred in the 2007 Saramaka v. Suriname case (as Suriname has not ratified ILO 169), adding an even later starting date for autonomous FPIC obligations to the timeline.


Image 4: Created by author, partly based on analysis of Daniel Cerqueira
Image 4: Created by author, partly based on analysis of Daniel Cerqueira

This does not mean that these judges absolve States of their responsibilities before this date. Instead, they suggest finding violations of other rights in the ACHR, such as the right to effective enjoyment of property (Art. 21 ACHR), the right to access to information (Art. 13 ACHR) and the right to effective participation (Art. 23 ACHR). Nevertheless, these dissenting opinions reflect the oscillation in earlier jurisprudence, and a change in the Court’s composition might lead to a return to a later start date for FPIC obligations.



Marine habitat & precautionary principle


Other developments highlighted in the separate opinions were the inclusion of marine areas within the concept of functional habitat and the precautionary principle, which originates in environmental law.


Because Cayos Cochinos is an archipelago, many of the State’s measures affected not only access to land but also to the sea. To include these marine areas, which are not property of the Indigenous community, the Court used its recent concept of functional habitat: the habitat that guarantees the community’s physical, cultural, and economic subsistence. This was first conceptualised in the 2024 Tageari Taromenane v. Ecuador case, which dealt with the rights of an Indigenous community living in voluntary isolation. In his concurring opinion to the Cayos Cochinos judgement, Judge Mudrovitsch described and applauded this development, while Judge Perez Goldberg opined that this application should remain limited to this case and should not be treated as precedent.


A final development that received comments in the separate opinions was the use of the precautionary principle. This environmental law principle obliges states to take measures to address environmental impacts even when there is no scientific certainty about them. The Court used this principle before in its Advisory Opinions on the Environment (OC-23/17) and on the Climate Emergency (OC-32/25). In the Cayos Cochinos judgment, the Court found a violation of the right to collective property (art. 21) because the State failed to observe the precautionary principle. The Court found that the State had not issued preventive, control, or mitigation measures for the risks related to tourism and the filmed reality show in the restricted area. Judge Perez Goldberg criticised this reliance on the environmental precautionary principle, stating that the file contained enough evidence to find a violation without building the argument around this principle.


However, another element of international environmental law was present in the case. While it was not discussed in any separate opinion, the formulation the Court used when discussing the relationship between Indigenous peoples and conservation may be an interesting opening for future development of the case law.



A principle of compatibility of protected areas and Indigenous rights


In paragraph 107 of the judgment, when discussing the territory of the Indigenous Garífuna, the Court used the formulation (translation from Spanish) “in principle, there exists a compatibility between the protected nature areas and the right of Indigenous and tribal peoples to the protection of natural resources in their territories”. It added that Indigenous peoples, because of their relationship with nature and ways of life, make a relevant contribution to this conservation.


A similar sentiment appears in Pueblo U’Wa v. Colombia (para 145), where the Court identified the need to ‘compatibilize’ (compatibilizar) the two objectives of nature conservation and Indigenous rights protection. This line of jurisprudence originated in the 2015 Kaliña and Lokono v. Suriname case, where the Court explicitly stated that nature protection and Indigenous rights are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary (paras 171-180). To support this statement, it cited several international environmental law instruments, such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. These documents recognise the vital role Indigenous peoples and their practices play in conserving and sustainably using biodiversity. The CBD urges states to protect customary uses of the environment, as these are compatible with nature protection. Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration similarly emphasises the importance of Indigenous participation in conservation practices.


The Court has clearly established the link and the possibility of compatibility between Indigenous rights and nature protection. However, the specific formulation in Cayos Cochinos could sharpen this idea. It framed compatibility as a principle, rather than a conclusion drawn from the facts (Kaliña and Lokono) or a need to ‘compatibilize’ (Pueblo U’wa). This strengthens the position of Indigenous peoples in nature conservation debates. Instead of weighing Indigenous rights against the justifiable goal of nature protection, the Court undermines this false dichotomy. By asserting compatibility as a given, the Court emphasises a rights-based approach to conservation. This approach opposes the idea that state and/or private organisation-led conservation is better than centring Indigenous knowledge and interests.


This is no trivial matter. While international environmental law seeks to highlight the importance of Indigenous participation, national realities do not reflect it. Worldwide, Indigenous communities are still displaced by conservation efforts that do not recognise their knowledge. Environmental conservation is an important goal in the face of global warming and the biodiversity crisis. However, in the process of enacting measures to protect nature, misinformation and prejudice towards Indigenous peoples have created an exclusionary conservation landscape worldwide. Indigenous communities are faced with state control of their ancestral territories and the criminalisation of their traditional conservation practices. They are displaced, arrested for “trespassing” in protected areas, and their FPIC is not respected when protected areas are established.


Meanwhile, a growing body of research shows that conservation effectiveness depends on including Indigenous peoples and local populations. This counteracts state narratives that Indigenous peoples lack ‘the expert capacity’ (Kaliña and Lokono, para 190) to have a prominent role in nature conservation. While international environmental law has shown commitment to this inclusion, translation into national law, institutions, funding organisation rules, and rights-based law enforcement is still lacking.


The Inter-American Court of Human Rights can contribute to this translation from a human rights perspective, joining UN bodies like the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Environmental law agencies are creating opportunities to incorporate human rights in conservation policy, such as the recent UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Core Human Rights Principles for Private Conservation Organisations and Funders. The Court can, in turn, develop its jurisprudence on what these human rights in conservation exactly entail. Signalling that nature conservation has a principal role for Indigenous communities is a good first step.



Conclusion


As the fight of the Garífuna community in Honduras continues, it is important to remember the context in which this struggle takes place. Environmental initiatives that do not have a human-rights-based approach harm the very people who have lived in and with these environments for many years. The IACtHR Cayos Cochinos judgment therefore offers a timely contribution to this discussion, as well as updates on its other lines of case law, such as the application ratio temporis of Article 26 ACHR, the precautionary principle and a legal framework for marine habitats.

 
 

 

© 2018 Programme for Studies on Human Rights in Context

Ghent University - Belgium

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