Ms Fezile Osum
Fezile holds an LLB degree from the University of Kent and a Human Rights Law (LLM) degree from İstanbul Bilgi University. She is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Central Lancashire and her research involves conflict-related sexual violence and transitional justice. She has been awarded the Senesh Fellowship from the International Peace Research Association Foundation (IPRA Foundation) for the years 2021 and 2022 for her PhD research. She currently works as a Research Assistant at the EU-funded InPeace Project, focusing on Bi-Communal Technical Committees in Cyprus to assess their effectiveness and peacebuilding potential.
Introduction
It has long been accepted that the inclusion of women and gender-related issues in peace negotiations improves the outcomes of peace processes and fosters sustainable and inclusive peace agreements. Despite this, gender issues remain marginalized, with limited women's participation and neglect of gender perspectives in peace negotiations. Worldwide, peace negotiations are usually elite-driven and top-down processes, resulting in the exclusion of key social groups, such as women and LGBTI+s. Likewise, the peace negotiations in Cyprus have historically been exclusionary, with great male dominance. Cyprus, an island located in the Mediterranean, was suffering ethnic divisions and interethnic violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s, following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In 1974, a coup d'état organised by the Greek military aimed to annex the island to Greece. A few days later, Turkey launched a military operation in Cyprus, resulting in the invasion of one-third of the island. In 1983, the occupied territory self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" illegally in the eyes of the United Nations Security Council. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus is Cyprus's only internationally recognised state. However, it has been unable to exercise effective control over the northern part of the island, which is predominantly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots and has a strong Turkish military presence. Efforts to solve the Cyprus issue have been going on for many decades, but they have historically been exclusionary and run with great male dominance.
To tackle this, the Bi-Communal Technical Committee on Gender (hereafter the “Gender Committee”) was introduced by the leader of the Greek Cypriot community Mr. Nicos Anastasiades and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Mr. Mustafa Akıncı in 2015, aiming to incorporate gender perspective into the peace process. The Committee comprised approximately 10 members from each community (i.e. 10 Greek Cypriots and 10 Turkish Cypriots), including both women and men with diverse backgrounds. The Committee's establishment has been one of the most significant steps to address the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, which seeks to increase the involvement of women and gender perspectives in peace processes. This blog article explores the role of the Gender Committee within a multi-track diplomacy framework, evaluating its work during nearly a decade of operations. It argues that the Gender Committee falls under semi-official Track 1.5 diplomacy, involving its members working in their private capacities, under the guidance of their respective leadership. In this level of diplomacy, the dialogues between the parties are unofficial but at the same time, they work very closely with the political leadership. Hence, having the ability to submit their suggestions directly to the leaders provides a particular advantage to the Gender Committee. Despite this advantage, the Gender Committee has had a weak impact, particularly due to political pressure, its weak structure and programming, and lack of access to key intelligence regarding the negotiation process.
Multi-Track Diplomacy as a model for inclusion
Multi-track diplomacy aims to diversify the stakeholders contributing to the peace processes. It promotes different levels of dialogue and collaboration, in which official, as well as non-official actors such as civil society actors, contribute towards reaching a peace agreement. Although the term “multi-track” was first proposed during the 1970s, its development as a theory and as practice became prominent during the 1990s. The concept gained popularity primarily through the pyramid model proposed by John Paul Lederach. In his model, Lederach advocates for a three-track approach to peace processes, each representing different levels of society.
Track 1 involves official diplomacy run by leaders and top diplomats, Track 2 includes representatives from civil society, and Track 3 encompasses businesspeople and larger societal groups. Track 1 initiatives have the strongest impact on peace processes since they involve top-level diplomats with access to key information regarding negotiation files, financial resources, and extensive knowledge of their own and conflicting parties' policies. However, they are composed of small groups that are mainly run by men and have a major focus on bargaining for each side's interest, rather than seeking ways for conflict resolution. Track 2 initiatives, on the other hand, involve various stakeholder groups working in an unofficial capacity to contribute to reaching an agreement. Track 2 initiatives complement Track 1 processes and work for conflict resolution, in which the parties have the opportunity to move beyond the bargaining that takes place in Track 1 and create an inclusive space for stakeholders to voice their demands and needs from the peace process. While some Track 2 initiatives focus solely on contributing to the negotiations run at the Track 1 level, others are concerned with “softer” elements, such as education programmes run by civil society actors, aiming to break the stereotypes between the conflicting parties. Although Track 2 is more inclusive than Track 1, its influence can be very limited, especially when Track 1 actors are not willing to cooperate with civil society.
As the practice of the multi-track diplomacy model advanced, another concept eventually evolved, labelled “Track 1.5 processes”. This was proposed in the 1990s and involves mostly officials from the conflicting sides, working in their private capacities but under the supervision of their respective political leaders. This model also involves unofficial members (members that are not involved in public service roles), working with the instructions they receive from their leaders. In both cases, whether they are involved in public service roles or not, they act under the instructions of their political leaders. Track 1.5 is very similar to Track 1 and its official process but occurs when the two parties do not want to call it such, mostly due to recognition concerns (which are also present in Cyprus). One example of Track 1.5 is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in Oslo, which began as a Track 2 initiative but soon turned into a Track 1.5 effort, with officials participating in negotiations in their private capacities, under the auspices of their leaders. This arrangement was necessary due to Israel's strict policies against actions that might imply recognition of the Palestinian State.
The Bi-Communal Technical Committee on Gender as a Track 1.5 Diplomacy Mechanism
The Gender Committee was introduced in 2015 as one of 12 Bi-communal Technical Committees in Cyprus that were established with the general mandate of “addressing issues that affect the day-to-day life of people, through encouraging and facilitating greater interaction and understanding between the two communities”, and that are run under the auspices of the UN. This development was welcomed by feminists and peace activists working for sustainable peace in Cyprus.
The Bi-Communal Technical Committees are run in close coordination with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships and their members are directly appointed by their respective leaders. The specific mandate of the Gender Committee is the following:
The Committee will look into the gender perspective of how life in Cyprus is affected as a result of the status quo. Like all other technical committees, it may submit recommendations on how to overcome specific issues or suggest ways of better integrating the gender perspective. It is a mechanism for bringing gender specific and sensitive issues to the forefront and, in this context and bearing in mind UNSCR 1325, may also provide input as to what needs to be borne in mind from a gender perspective in the framework of the settlement. Specific recommendations on ensuring gender equality in a united Cyprus may be submitted to this end.
When the Gender Committee was first established, it comprised approximately 10 members from each community (i.e. 10 Greek Cypriots and 10 Turkish Cypriots), including both women and men with diverse backgrounds. Additionally, a facilitator from the UN was appointed, similar to other Bi-Communal Technical Committees. Unlike some other Technical Committees, the Gender Committee involved members from civil society and academia, although it also included politicians representing different political parties.
Due to their closeness to the leaders and negotiation process, some consider the Technical Committees as Track 1 diplomacy mechanisms. Track 1 mechanisms have the strongest influence on the negotiations, as previously explained. A mechanism addressing gender issues within this track would therefore have a strong impact on the peace negotiations for Cyprus. The members of the Gender Committee, like the rest of the Bi-Communal Technical Committees, are accountable to the chief negotiator and the leader of each community. The Gender Committee runs under the auspices of the two leaders and is accountable to them for all its activities and public communication. This tied relationship shows that the members operate in a diplomatic context, engaging with the highest levels of key decision-makers in negotiation processes. However, although they operate in such a context, their work remains fully voluntary and restricted.
The members of the Gender Committee operate fully voluntarily and in their private capacities, without any payment for their time dedicated. This is an indicator of the Gender Committee not falling under Track 1, since officials in that track would work professionally in diplomatic positions, dedicating longer hours and efforts. Also, the Committee members are not provided access to negotiation working files and information sources needed to formulate useful suggestions, which complicates their ability to provide informed input. For example, during the peace negotiations between 2015 and 2017, despite members requesting more information on what was being discussed, the leaders did not respond. The peace negotiations failed after the Cyprus conference held in Crans Montana in July 2017 with the participation of the leaders, guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and the UK) and the UN. During this time, members were not provided with adequate information, yet at the same time, they were mandated to formulate informed and negotiable policies on gender. This resulted in them being excluded largely from the negotiation processes, even though they were working under the auspices of their leadership.
An interviewee from the Gender Committee responded to the question concerning how they prioritised projects by stating:
Imagine that everything was hidden from us. We could neither enter the negotiation meetings nor were we informed about what was discussed in them. As a result, we didn't have to prioritise anything because we couldn't do much anyway.
Furthermore, the Gender Committee may also be perceived as Track 2, since it has members from civil society and academia. Also, these members are not essentially working on negotiation files, rather their work is largely undefined and unstructured. However, the members are appointed by their respective leaders and are accountable to the chief negotiator and the leader of each community. This level of direct involvement by political leaders and the UN as a facilitator is not a characteristic of Track 2 initiatives. Track 2 efforts operate independently of political constraints, providing a neutral space for stakeholders, particularly those marginalized in formal negotiations, to express their concerns and demands.
The factors outlined suggest that the Committee does not fit into either Track 1 or Track 2 mechanisms but rather Track 1.5. Although this mechanism does not exert the same influence over negotiations as Track 1, it remains an entity that is closest to the leadership and thus, potentially impacts the peace process in the long term, if the leaders show a political willingness to support its work.
The Assessment of the Work of the Bi-Communal Technical Committee on Gender
The Gender Committee implemented several activities until today, focusing on women's participation in politics and peace negotiations by organising panels and seminars. However, its main success has been the adoption of the Action Plan by the leaders two years ago (Full title: Action Plan on how to ensure women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in the settlement process/an eventual settlement process). It is a two-page document providing recommendations on women's representation, inclusion of civil society and gender equality perspectives in the settlement process. The Action Plan was officially launched at a public event, where the two leaders were present. However, a year after its adoption, the UN Secretary-General reported that no significant progress had been made in its implementation and suggested that to support the implementation of the Action Plan, the Gender Committee should engage with civil society actors "to immediately establish a robust standing platform for regular consultations with ‘all of civil society’".
While the emphasis on civil society inclusion in the Action Plan is important, organizations focusing on gender within civil society were not properly consulted by the Committee, neither during the drafting stage of the Action Plan nor in subsequent activities. The Committee's lack of proper and regular collaboration with civil society has resulted in its limited endorsement and support by key civil society actors. Research conducted under the InPeace Project, which is funded by the European Union (EU) under the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community and implemented by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law, Alternative and Innovative Methods (ICLAIM) and the Human Rights Platform (IHP) confirmed this, as the civil society representatives we interviewed were feeling largely excluded from the activities of the Gender Committee. None of the civil society representatives we talked to could explain the functions of the Committee properly, nor could they tell the names of its current members, since such information was not provided to them. Even during the first months of the InPeace Project, researchers faced challenges in identifying the members of the Committee. This lived experience has shown that the Gender Committee, although clearly encouraged to have a regular dialogue with civil society, has simply not performed this task.
One of the reasons for the disappointing performance is the political pressure faced by the Gender Committee. Civil society actors have not been involved in the Committee's core work or the drafting of key documents like the Action Plan. Although some members had a civil society background, they faced political pressure to distance civil society stakeholders from their work. This led to mistrust or lack of knowledge regarding their work amongst the civil society. It should be noted that the Turkish Cypriot members currently experience stricter control, while the Greek Cypriot members have shown more openness, particularly regarding inviting various civil society actors to their public events such as panels or seminars on general gender-related issues. These panels or seminars mainly involved generic issues related to gender rather than focusing on the Committee's actual work and how civil society could contribute.
What is interesting is that, even during the previous period, when pro-peace leaders were in charge of both communities and negotiations were going on, the Gender Committee was still not allowed to share information about their work agendas or to have regular consultations with civil society organizations. When asked about the reasons for this, they were told that confidentiality was important to allow the Committee to proceed with its work smoothly, without any public interference or potential harm from those in both communities who are firmly against the solution to the Cyprus issue. Considering the Committee's working area, the confidentiality requirement appears contradictory. However, it seems like neither Greek Cypriot nor Turkish Cypriot members could challenge this practice very effectively.
Apart from that, the Gender Committee also has been suffering from a lack of structure and coordination. Because of the broad scope of gender issues, its focus areas remain undefined. Establishing a framework outlining specific areas and main activities could provide clarity and direction. In addition, it faces ambiguity regarding its approach to gender studies, leaving the definition of the concept unclear. For example, it is uncertain whether the Gender Committee will focus solely on women's rights or adopt a more inclusive approach involving both women and LGBTI+s. In the absence of a clear road map and agenda, the Committee's efforts appear to be far from achieving a meaningful outcome in integrating gender perspectives into the peace process.
To sum up, the Gender Committee has the potential to serve as a bridge between civil society and the negotiation table, provided it receives support from leaders, alongside achieving a well-structured framework. Given that Cyprus has long had civil society initiatives strongly advocating for the integration of gender perspectives in negotiations, it would be fair to say that the Gender Committee holds significant potential to contribute towards this goal.
* Since the failure of the peace talks in Crans Montana in 2017, efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue have been at a standstill. No peace negotiations have taken place since then. The Greek Cypriot leader currently advocates for resuming discussions based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation model, while the Turkish Cypriot leader supports a ‘two-state solution’ that is rejected by the international community. It is hoped that a common ground can be established, leading to a new phase of negotiations in the near future, to which this research will contribute.
This blog article is prepared under the InPeace (Inclusive Peacebuilding) Project, which was funded by the European Union under the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community. InPeace is implemented by the ICLAIM and the Human Rights Platform.
This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of ICLAIM and the Human Rights Platform and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
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